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"Quick-Takes" on a Few Recent Decisions in 
Evidence Law ... and Rule 5-407 
Lynn McLain, Professor 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
May 9, 2003 
I. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Local Government's Zoning Decision: 
Attorney's Unsworn Statements Are Not Evidence 
Heard v. Foxshire, 145 Md. App. 695, 806 A.2d 348 (Sept. 3,2002) (Sharer, 1.) 
(county board of appeals' decision to grant special exception was not supported by 
sufficient evidence, as applicant's attorney's statement was unsworn and thus did not 
qualifY as evidence). 
II. Condemnation 
Bern-Shaw Ltd. Partnership v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 148 Md. App. 
313,811 A.2d 869 (Dec. 3,2002) (1. Eyler, J.). 
• Comparable Sales!: No error in admitting, over landowner's objection, evidence 
of price that landowner had paid for property 18 years before quick-take at issue; 
landowner could cross-examine witness so as to affect weight of that evidence; 
concept of who bears burden of proof is inapposite to what is "just 
compensation; " 
• Jury View2: Jury view is mandated, unless both parties sign a waiver; no undue 
prejudice from post-taking view of then rat-infested property, because landowner 
free to point out changes that occurred after taking; court affirmed jury verdict for 
less than experts for either side had testified to. 
III. Attorney-Client Privilege3 
A. Waiver by Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Matter 
Elkton Care Center Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Quality Care 
Management, 145 Md. App. 532, 805 A.2d 1177 (Aug. 29, 2002) (Murphy, c.1.). 
I See generally McLain, vol. 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 40 1:2 at 495-97 (2d ed. 
2001) (Thomson/West 1-800-328-4880 ext. 4) (hereinafter, "MARYLAND EVIDENCE"). 
2 See generally id. § 403:8 at 599-601. 
3 See generally vol. 6 id. §§ 503: 1-21 at 37-118. 
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• "Intermediate Text" Adopted by CSA 
Under the adopted test, in detennining whether inadvertent disclosure 
results in waiver of the privilege, the court must consider: 
"( I) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the 
number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosure; (4) 
any delay [in] measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) whether 
the overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by 
relieving a party of its error." 
145 Md. App. at 545 (citation omitted). 
• Application of Test to Facts of Case 
The trial court was held to have properly found that waiver occurred when 
a privileged document (from prior counsel) was included in a half-full box 
provided by trial counsel to opposing counsel, who tabbed the document and 
returned it, asking that it be copied. Thus, appellant's trial counsel had two 
occasions during the discovery phase to assert the privilege; raising the issue near 
the end of the trial was too late. 
B. Waiver: Maryland Public Information Act ("MPIA") 
Caffrey v. Department of Liquor Control for MontgomelY County, 370 
Md. 272, 805 A.2d 268 (Aug. 23,2002) (Harrell, 1.). 
An unsuccessful bidder (ranked 4th of 6) for the operation and 
management of a county-owned retail liquor store submitted requests under the 
MPIA to the Montgomery County Department of Liquor Control (DLC), Board of 
License Commissioners (BLC), Of1ice of Procurement (OP), and Ethics 
Commission (EC) for various documents relating to the relevant proposal and 
selection process. The county agencies -- relying on counsel's advice based on 
both the attorney-client and the deliberative interagency/executive privilege4 
exceptions to the MPIA - produced only some of the documents. The requestor 
sued in circuit court. 
The press had reported that the contract in question had gone to a member 
of the BLC. He subsequently resigned and was reprimanded by the EC. After suit 
was filed, the County disclosed the remaining documents -- citing the increased 
need for public understanding about the liquor store procurement, because of 
press coverage. 
4 See generally vol. 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 509: 1-2 at 180-210. 
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The County filed for summary judgment, asking that the court uphold the 
initial nondisclosure as "reasonable and justifiable at the time," under various 
provisions of the MPIA. The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, seeking actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and 
costs caused by the need to file suit. 
• Circuit Court's Decision 
a. Immunity of DIC pursuant to Statute 
The circuit court (Rowan, 1.) held that Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code § 5-
504, the general provision of which makes the OLC immune "from all suits for 
damages," made the OLC immune from suit other than for enforcement of its 
contracts. The court thus declined to reach the issue whether the OLC had 
properly withheld 19 documents that the plaintiff had requested .. 
b. Effect of County Charter with regard to MPIA 
The circuit court then addressed the plaintiff's argument that § 505 of the 
Montgomery County Charter constituted a waiver of any attorney-client or 
executive deliberative/interagency privilege that was not reserved under the 
Charter. Section 505 provides: 
Any person shall have the right to inspect any document, except 
confidential police records, personnel records, or records of a 
confidential private nature as defined by law. The Council may adopt 
reasonable regulations for such inspection. A certified copy of any such 
document shall be furnished upon payment of a reasonable fee 
established by such regulations. This section shall not apply to a 
document or other material obtained or prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for use in legal proceedings to which the County is a party. 
The circuit court rejected the waiver argument. 
c. Application of MP IA 
The circuit court went on to find that the BLC, OP, and EC had proper 
reasons for withholding 6 of the 8 documents that they had initially declined to 
disclose. The court also dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's request for actual 
and punitive damages under the MPIA and denied the plaintiff's motion for 
counsel fees and costS.5 
; See, as to counsel fees and costs under the MPIA, Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 
196 (1998). 
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• Court of Appeals' Decision re: Attorney's Fees and Costs 
After the Court of Special Appeals affinned the circuit court in an 
unreported opinion, certiorari was sought and granted with regard only to the issue 
of attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Appeals (Harrell, J.) reversed and 
remanded. 
a. Statute Did Not Immunize DLC from Suits/or Attorney's Fees and 
Costs 
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the circuit court's conclusion that 
the DLC's immunity, pursuant to Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-504, "from all suits for 
damages" included attorney's fees and costs that would otherwise be available 
under § 10-623(f) of the MPIA "[i]fthe court detennines that the complainant has 
substantially prevailed .... " The Court of Appeals found that, in enacting § 5-
504's precursor in 1941, the General Assembly acted with knowledge that the 
"American Rule" distinguishes between damages and counsel fees. Therefore, 
§ 5-504 did not preclude recovery against the DLC for attorney's fees and costs. 
The Court of Appeals remanded to the circuit court to consider whether 
the DLC had properly withheld the sought-after documents, because that decision 
could affect whether the plaintiff could be considered to have "substantially 
prevailed." If the plaintiff had "substantially prevailed," he could be entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. 
b. County Charter Could Not Generally Vitiate "Mandatory 
Denials" under MP lA, but Could and Did Waive "Permissible 
Denials, " as well as Privileges County Held, that Would have 
Otherwise Resulted in Mandatory Denials 
The Court of Appeals also remanded on the counsel fees and costs issue as 
to the other three defendants, because the Court of Appeals found that the circuit 
court had erred in its reading of the combined effect of the Charter and the MPIA. 
i. Effect as to MPIA 's "Mandatory Denials" 
The Court of Appeals pointed out that, by virtue of the preemption 
doctrine, a county charter cannot generally permit the release of public records 
that the state statute would prohibit. 3 70 Md. at 3 02-03. It thus held first that § 5-
505 of the County Charter could not effect a blanket waiver of the MPIA's 
provisions of "mandatory denial" of inspection in §§ 10-615 - 10-617: 
For example, as provided in MPIA § 10-615, 
"[a] custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a 
public record if: 
(I) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or 
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(2) the inspection would be contrary to: 
0) a State statute; 
Oi) a federal statute or a regulation that is issued under the statute and has the force 
of law; 
(iii) the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals; or 
(iv) an order ofa court of record." 
370 Md. at 296, 303. 
But, because the attorney-client privilege (that would otherwise be 
honored by virtue of § 10-615(1 »)6 can be waived by the client, § 505 "effectuates 
a limited waiver of that privilege." 370 Md. at 304. The footnote following this 
intriguing comment suggests that the privilege as to all attorney-client privileged 
communications is waived, except with regard to the attorney work product 
doctrine. The pertinent part of the footnote provides: 
Obviously, if documents qualify as "a document or other material 
obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for use in legal 
proceedings to which the County is a party," they would be exempted 
expressly from release under § 505, quite apart from any separate 
common law attorney-client privilege. 
Id. at 304 n.18. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had 
erred in concluding that the BLC had properly withheld documents under the 
attorney-client privilege, if the documents were not '''obtained or prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for use in legal proceedings to which the County is a 
party.'" Id. at 311. 
The same footnote then drops another bombshell, but in dictum: § 505 
may also "be interpreted as effectuating a waiver of [the executive] privileges 
[implicitly] protected under MPIA, § 10-615(1)." That part of the footnote reads: 
In addition, MPIA § I 0-615( 1) also prohibits the release of public 
records subject to the executive privilege. See Ojjice of the Governor, 
360 Md. at 557, 759 A.2d at 269 (explaining that if the records at issue 
in that case were "non-disclosable under the executive privilege 
doctrine, then such records or parts of records were exempt from 
disclosure under § 10-615(1) of the Maryland Public Information Act"). 
Although not relevant here (because Respondents asserted executive 
privilege pursuant to the permissible interagency/intraagency 
documents denial, see MPIA § I 0-618(b», to the extent the executive 
privilege may be waived (see Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 570 
n.IO, 414 A.2d 914, 928 n.1O (1980) ("Although it is said that 
executive privilege may be waived, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 
6 See Caffrey, 370 Md. at 285 n.7 ("In Harris v. Baltimore Sun, 330 Md. 595, 604-05, 625 A.2d 941, 945 
(1993), we explained that if a 'requested public record is "information relating to representation of a client," which if 
disclosed by the attorney, would place the attorney in violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 
(,Confidentiality of Information') 'the information is confidential under § I 0-615( I) and not to be produced under 
the Act. '''). 
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[1,] 7, [59 S. Ct. 528,532,97 L. Ed. 727 (1953)], there is very little 
case law in the appellate courts with respect to waiver of an executive 
privilege claim. "», § 505 may also be interpreted as effectuating a 
waiver of that privilege as protected under MPIA § 10-615(1). 
ld. at 304 n.18. 
ii. Effect as to MPIA 's "Permissible Denials" 
Section 505 did, however, effect a blanket waiver of the MPIA's 
"permissible denials," insofar as they are broader than the limited categories 
excepted from disclosure by § 505. Section 505 exempts only "confidential police 
records, personnel records, or records of a confidential nature as defined by law." 
The Court of Appeals interpreted the latter phrase to refer only to "confidential 
records regarding an individual's private matters, such as individual income tax 
returns, rather than to confidential records regarding, for instance, governmental 
or commercial information." 370 Md. at 302. Section 505 thus effects a waiver 
to the extent that MPIA § 1 0-618(b) would permit the withholding of other 
documents: 
As delineated in MPIA § 10-618, there are also records for which the 
custodian may deny inspection, "if the custodian believes that such 
inspection would be contrary to the public interest." Office of the 
Governor v. Washington Post, 360 Md. 520, 550-51, 759 A.2d 249, 
266 (2000). Relevant here, MPIA § I 0-618(b) mandates that, "the 
custodian may deny inspection by the applicant of ... any part of an 
interagency or intra-agency letter or memorandum that would not be 
available by law to a private party in litigation with the unit." 
370 Md. at 277, 305-06.7 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit 
court had erred in concluding that the EC properly withheld a document under the 
interagency/intraagency permissible denial category of § 1 0-618(b). 
c. County Attorney Had Warned of Possibility ~fCaffrey Outcome 
Ironically, the Court of Appeals cited 1980 and 2000 memos [rom the 
Montgomery County Attorney's Office that had predicted the decision reached by 
7 See Caffrey, 370 Md. at 285 n.8 ("The 'permissible denials' section of the MPIA states, in part, that 
'[ u}nless otherwise provided by law, if a custodian believes that inspection of a part of a public record by the 
applicant would be contrary to the public interest,' MPIA § 10-618, the 'custodian may deny inspection of any part 
of an interagency or intra-agency letter or memorandum that would not be available by law to a private party in 
litigation with the unit.' MPIA § I 0-618(b). We explained in Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 55l, 759 A.2d at 
266, that 
[the} permissible exemption for interagency and intra-agency letters or memoranda to some extent 
reflects that part of the executive privilege doctrine encompassing letters, memoranda or similar 
internal government documents containing confidential opinions, deliberations, advice or 
recommendations from one governmental employee or official to another official for the purpose 
of assisting the latter official in the decision-making function."). 
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the Court of Appeals. The County Attorney had proposed the following 
amendment to § 505 of the Charter: 
Any person shall have the right to inspect any document held by County 
government, except confidential police records, personnel records, 
records of a confidential private nature as defined by law, or records 
that may be exempted from disclosure under the state Public 
Information Act or other applicable state or federal law. The Council 
may adopt reasonable regulations for such inspection. A certified copy 
of any such document shall be furnished upon payment of a reasonable 
fee established by such regulations. This section shall not apply to a 
document or other material obtained or prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for use in legal proceedings to which the County is a party. 
(Emphasis added to indicate the added language). 
370 Md. at 308-09. But the amendment had been withdrawn before the County 
Council had taken final action on it. Id. at 309. 
C. Federal Seventh Circuit Holds that, in Criminal Proceedings, No Attorney-
Client Privile2e Exists for Confidential Communications between 
Government Officials and Government Lawyers 
• In Re: A Witness before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 
2002) 
Federal prosecutors investigating a bribery scandal in the Illinois Secretary 
of State's Office during the previous gubernatorial administration sought to 
interview the attorney who had been Chief Legal Counsel to that office, during 
former Secretary of State Ryan's tenure. Ryan asserted his attorney-client 
privilege. 
The federal district court granted the U.S. Attorney's motion to compel the 
attorney to testify about conversations he had had with Ryan in his official 
capacity as General Counsel. In a thoughtful opinion by Judge Diane Wood, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
[H]ere, we have a special case: the client is neither a private individual 
nor a private corporation. It is instead the State of Illinois itself, 
represented through one of its agencies. There is surprisingly little 
case law on whether a government agency may also be a client for 
purposes of this [attorney-client) privilege, but both parties here 
concede that, at least in the civil and regulatory context, the 
government is entitled to the same attorney-client privilege as any 
other client.s 
* * * 
8 (Emphasis added.) See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The Caffrey court assumes that the 
attorney-client privilege applies to communications between the Office of the County Attorney and County attornies. 
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While we recognize the need for full and frank communication 
between government officials, we are more persuaded by the serious 
arguments against extending the attorney-client privilege to protect 
communications between government lawyers and the public officials 
they serve when criminal proceedings are at issue. First, government 
lawyers have responsibilities and obligations different from those 
facing members of the private bar. While the latter are appropriately 
concerned first and foremost with protecting their clients -- even those 
engaged in wrongdoing -- from criminal charges and public exposure, 
government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the 
public interest. 
They take an oath, separate from their bar oath, to uphold the 
United States Constitution and the laws ofthis nation (and usually 
the laws of the state they serve when, as was the case with Bickel [the 
former Chief Legal Counsel for the Office of the Secretary of State], 
they are state employees). Their compensation comes not from a 
client whose interests they are sworn to protect from the power of the 
state, but from the state itself and the public fisc. It would be both 
unseemly and a misuse of public assets to penn it a public official to use 
a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the taxpayers themselves 
otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, official 
misconduct, or abuse of power. 
* * * 
Individuals and corporations are both subject to criminal liability 
for their transgressions. Individuals will not talk and corporations will 
have no incentive to conduct or cooperate in internal investigations if 
they know that any infonnation disclosed may be turned over to 
authorities. A state agency, however, cannot be held criminally 
liable by either the state itself or the federal government. There is thus 
no need to offer the attorney-client privilege as an incentive to 
increase compliance with the laws. 
True, individual state employees can be held liable, and many 
have been found guilty of crimes in this very investigation. But the 
privilege with which we are concerned today runs to the office, not 
to the employees in that office. Just as a corporate attorney has no 
right or obligation to keep otherwise confidential information from 
shareholders, so a government attorney should have no privilege to 
shield relevant information from the public citizens to whom she 
owes ultimate allegiance, as represented by the grand jury. 
Public officials are not the same as private citizens precisely 
because they exercise the power of the state. With this responsibility 
comes also the responsibility to act in the public interest. It follows that 
interpersonal relationships between an attorney for the state and a 
government official acting in an official capacity must be subordinated 
to the public interest in good and open government, leaving the 
government lawyer duty-bound to report internal criminal 
violations, not to shield them from public exposure. 
In the final analysis, reason and experience dictate that the lack of 
criminal liability for government agencies and the duty of public 
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lawyers to uphold the law and foster an open and accountable 
government outweigh any need for a privilege in this context. An 
officeholder wary of becoming enmeshed in illegal acts may always 
consult with a private attorney, and there the privilege 
unquestionably would apply. While Ryan fears that our refusal to 
recognize a privilege will cause even the most trivial of matters to be 
taken to outside counsel, this strikes us as unduly alarmist. 
In fact, analogous rules apply in the corporate realm, where 
attorneys are repeatedly admonished to advise corporate officials 
that they are not personal clients of the attorney and may wish to 
retain other counsel. These rules do not appear to have stifled 
corporate discussion or proved impossible to administer, and we see no 
reason why a similar result cannot be countenanced here. 
288 F .3d at 291-94 (citations omitted). 
D. Waiver by Dissemination 
1. Corporation Had Made Sufficient Showing that Dissemination Was 
Only to Those Who "Needed to Know" 
Federal Trade Comm 'n v. Glaxosmithkline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C. 
CiL 2002) (Lamberth, 1.). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held 
that the district court had erred in finding that the corporate defendant had 
waived its attorney-client privilege. The district court had imposed a 
burden on the corporation to explain why each employee, or public 
relations or governmental affairs consultant who had received privileged 
information, had needed it. The Court of Appeals rejected this allocation 
of the burden: 
The applicable standard is, as the district court recognized, whether 
"the documents were distributed on a 'need to know' basis or to 
employees that were 'authorized to speak or act' for the company." 
The Company's privilege log and the affidavit of Charles Kinzig 
establish that GSK circulated the documents in question only to 
specifically named employees and contractors, most of whom were 
attorneys or managers and all of whom "needed to provide input to 
the legal department and/or receive the legal advice and strategies 
formulated by counsel." The affidavit also states that each intended 
recipient was bound by corporate policy or, in the case of the 
contractors, by a separate understanding, to keep confidential the 
contents of the documents. The Company's submission thus leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that no document was "disseminated 
beyond those persons who, because ofthe corporate structure, needed 
to know its contents." 
The district court faulted GSK for not having explained "why any, 
let alone all, of the employees received copies of certain documents," 
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and the Commission likewise claims on brief that GSK should have 
shown why each individual in possession of a confidential document 
"needed the information [therein] to carry out his/her work." These 
demands are overreaching. The Company's burden is to show that it 
limited its dissemination of the documents in keeping with their 
asserted confidentiality, not to justify each determination that a 
particular employee should have access to the information therein. 
Not only would that task be Herculean -- especially when the sender 
and the recipient are no longer with the Company -- but it is wholly 
unnecessary. After all, when a corporation provides a confidential 
document to certain specified employees or contractors with the 
admonition not to disseminate further its contents and the contents of 
the documents are related generally to the employees' corporate duties, 
absent evidence to the contrary we may reasonably infer that the 
information was deemed necessary for the employees' or contractors' 
work. Compare Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 863 (confidentiality lost 
when organization "admitted that it does not know who has had 
access to the documents, and there is undisputed testimony that ... 
copies of the memoranda were circulated to all area offices"). We 
do not presume, therefore, that any business would include in a 
restricted circulation list a person with no reason to have access to the 
confidential document--that is, one who has no "need to know." 
Moreover, we can imagine no useful purpose in having a court 
review the business judgment of each corporate official who deemed it 
necessary or desirable for a particular employee or contractor to have 
access to a corporate secret. It suffices instead that the corporation 
limited dissemination to specific individuals whose corporate duties 
relate generally to the contents of the documents. As we have seen 
in this case, the privilege log and the Kinzig Declaration together 
establish that GSK did just that, and the Company thereby demonstrated 
its entitlement to the attorney-client privilege. The FTC has proffered 
nothing to the contrary. 
Our conclusion that the documents are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege extends also to those communications that 
GSK shared with its public relations and government affairs 
consultants. The Kinzig affidavit notes that GSK's corporate counsel 
"worked with these consultants in the same manner as they did with 
full-time employees; indeed, the consultants acted as part of a team with 
full-time employees regarding their particular assignments" and, as a 
result, the consultants "became integral members of the team 
assigned to deal with issues [thatl ... were completely intertwined 
with IGSK's I litigation and legal strategies." In these circumstances, 
"there is no reason to distinguish between a person on the corporation's 
payroll and a consultant hired by the corporation if each acts for the 
corporation and possesses the information needed by attorneys in 
rendering legal advice." 
294 F.3d at 147-48 (citations omitted). 
2. "Joint Defense" or "Common Interest" 
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Lasalle Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 112 
CD.Md. 2002) (Harvey, 1.). 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that 
attorney work product and attorney-client privileged documents shared 
with two of the law firm's clients were protected under "joint defense" or 
"common interest doctrine."). 
E. Dual Purpose -- Le~al and Business -- of Protected Work Product Possible 
LaSalle Bank, 209 F.R.D. 112 (D.Md. 2002). 
Citing a federal Second Circuit decision, the district court held: 
A document created because of anticipated litigation, which tends to 
reveal mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning 
the litigation, does not lose work product protection merely because it is 
[ also] intended to assist in the making of a business decision. 
209 F.R.D. at 121. 
IV. Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures9 
A. Maryland Rule 5-407, effective July 1, 1994, and derived from Fed. R. Evid. 407, 
effected a significant change in Maryland law. The Rule provides: 
Rule 5-407 SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 
(a) In General 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if in effect at the time of the 
event, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection 
with the event. 
(b) Admissibility for Other Purposes 
This Rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures 
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility 
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
B. Rule 5-407 is based on a combination of policy considerations and an evaluation 
of the probative value of a party's having taken subsequent remedial measures. 
1. For policy reasons, people should be encouraged to take subsequent 
remedial measures, even if the steps taken are more than the law 
~ See generally vol. 5 MARYLAND EvrDENCE §§ 407: 1-2. 
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requires of them. To allow evidence that they took such steps to be 
admissible against them may discourage their doing so. 
See Polansky v. Ryobi America Corp., 760 F. Supp. 85 (D.Md.1991) 
(policy underlying Fed.R.Evid. 407 did not apply to protect defendant, 
when it continued to market the product in question after it introduced a 
safer model; nor did Fed.R.Evid. 403 require exclusion of evidence). 
2. Rule 5-407 is also in part simply a specific application of the general 
principles enunciated in Rule 5-403. The probative value of evidence 
that a party remedied a situation, where offered to show that party's 
earlier negligence or culpability, is low and is substantially 
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
and misleading, distraction, or confusion of the trier of fact. See 
Columbia v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 12 S. Ct. 591 (1892); Tuer v. 
McDonald, 347 Md. 507, 523 & n.8, 701 A.2d 1101 (1997); Ziehm v. 
United Elec. L. & P. Co., 104 Md. 48, 61, 64 A. 61 (1906). 
On the other hand, when pursuant to Rule 5-407(b) the evidence is 
offered to prove any purpose other than fault, such as ownership or 
control when the defendant denies ownership or control, its probative 
value on that other proposition may be greatly enhanced. 
C. Applicability of Rule 5-407: What Are Subsequent Remedial Measures? 
1. They must be subsequent to the incident, e.g., accident, giving rise to 
liability. 
2. Remedial measures include: 
a. Repairs (e.g., replacing rotten boards); 
b. Adding protective devices (e.g., adding a fence or a handrail); 
c. Rule/procedure changes (e.g., requiring a hospital employee to 
wheel a patient out to the car awaiting the patient); 
d. Personnel changes (e.g., firing a bad driver); 
e. Product design change; directions or warning letter. 
3. Remedial measures do not necessarily include investigative reports 
disclosing defects, and later leading to the taking of remedial 
measures. Prentiss & Carlisle v. Koehring- Waterous, 972 F .2d 6 (1 st Cir. 
1992); Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 375-76, 620 A.2d 
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989,994 (1993) (consultant's report on elevator safety, prepared at request 
of building owner nine months after accident, was not a subsequent 
remedial measure, because it was not a change in owner's conduct), rev'd 
on other grounds, 334 Md. 231, 638 A.2d 762 (1994). But see Complaint 
o/Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). 
In BGE v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75, 100-02,684 A.2d 456 (1996), 
Judge Bloom, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, stated: 
When an objection is made that plaintiffs counsel is attempting to 
introduce evidence of a "remedial measure" that should be excluded under Rule 
5-407(a), the trial judge must make a factual determination as to whether the 
testimony sought to be elicited would be about a subsequent remedial measure 
within Rule 5-407(a) and, if so, whether it would be admissible under Rule 5-
407(b). Such factual findings by the trial judge are entitled to great deference 
and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, i. e" unsupported by any 
substantial evidence, Heat & Power Corp, v, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc, 
320 Md. 584, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990); Mayor a/Rockville v, Walker, 100 Md. 
App. 240, 640 A,2d 751 (1994); Md. Rule 8-131(c). 
[A BGE employee]'s testimony [on cross-examination] indicated that at 
the [city council] meeting (which occurred about two weeks after the accident) he 
spoke about past safety practices of BGE [regarding climbable trees near 
overhead electric wires] and post-accident internal discussions involving the 
potential impact of the incident on those practices, He stated that the purpose 
of his appearance at the Bowie town meeting was solely in response to a crisis, or 
"damage control." Reference was made to a manual of guidelines printed in June 
1993, which contained material that reflected both pre-accident practices and 
post-accident change of policy. Since the meeting was shortly after the accident 
and the guidelines were not published until about nine months later, Judge 
Spell bring concluded, reasonably, that the post-accident policy changes had not 
been formulated as of the date of the town meeting. We hold, therefore, that the 
trial judge's factual finding that [the employeel's comments at the meeting 
did not constitute evidence of "Subsequent Remedial Measures" within the 
meaning of Rule 5-407 was not clearly erroneous. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Suggested Coping Strategy: Implement policy that future accidents, etc. be 
reported to counsel and that studies, etc. taken in response to accidents are to be 
prepared for submission to counsel, in anticipation of litigation. Studies will be 
shared only on a need-to-know basis. 
D. When Is Admission of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures 
Forbidden by the Rule? 
1. The Evidence is Inadmissible if Offered to Show Lack of Due Care, 
Negligence or Culpable Conduct 
Prior to the adoption of Rule 5-407, the Maryland case law held that 
having taken remedial measures after an accident or injury was 
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inadmissible as an admission of liability, but admissible on the issue of 
whether the defendant had exercised due care at the time of the accident or 
injury. Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284, 563 A.2d 392 (1989). Because 
admission for that purpose would tend "to prove negligence or culpable 
conduct," the Rule forbids it. The Rule overrules Wilson. Tuer v. 
McDonald, 347 Md. at 522-23. 
2. Who Took the Remedial Measures? 
a. Rule 5-407 applies only to the allegedly liable party's action, not 
to those of, e.g., other landlords or manufacturers, or of the plaintiff. 
See, e.g., TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 
(4th Cir. 1994); Blaw-Knox Canst. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 88 Md. App. 
655,660-62,596 A.2d 679, 681-82 (1991) (no error to admit 
evidence of remedial measures taken not by the defendant but by a 
third party). 
b. Evidence of remedial measures taken by persons other than the 
defendant is not excluded by Rule 5-407 (though its admission is 
subject to other Rules, including 5-403). See Middleton v. Harris 
Press & Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1986) (although remedial 
measure evidence was not excluded under Rule 407, because measure 
was taken by someone other than the defendant, exclusion was proper 
under Rule 403, due to tendency of evidence to divert the jury's 
attention from the defendant's conduct at the time of manufacture). 
3. Was the Measure Voluntary, or Compelled by Governmental 
Directive? 
The Rules Committee advocated following the Fourth Circuit and 
applying the Rule to evidence of measures taken when a governmental 
directive requires that they be taken. See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 
856 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir. 1988); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 
859-60 (4th Cir. 1980). The Committee took no position on whether the 
governmental directive itself would or should be excluded by Rule 5-407. 
The Court of Appeals left these issues to development through the case 
law. 
4. Does the Rule Apply to Strict Liability Cases? 
a. The Court of Special Appeals has said yes, the rule applies to strict 
liability cases. E.g., Blaw-Knox Construction Equipment Co. v. 
Morris, 88 Md. App. 655 (1991). 
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b. The Court of Appeals left this question to development through the 
case law. 
c. The Maryland Rule is written - contrary to the 1997 amended 
federal rule - so as potentially to accommodate the release of an 
unreasonably dangerous product into the stream of commerce as an 
"event," so that remedial measures taken before injury to the plaintifT 
could be protected by the Rule. 
E. When Does the Rule Permit Admission of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial 
Measures (Subject to the Court's Exclusion, In Its Discretion, Pursuant to 
Rule 5-403)? 
1. General Principles 
a. Because Rule 5-407 states that it "does not require the exclusion" 
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered for a 
purpose other than "to prove negligence or culpable conduct," "such 
as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment," the court retains 
discretion to exclude the evidence under Rule 5-403. See, e.g., In 
re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 531 (6th Cir. 1996). 
b. If the evidence is admitted, its opponent should request a limiting 
instruction under Rule 5-105. 
2. What Is Sufficient to "Controvert" an Issue? 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 407 
states: 
The requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for automatic 
exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing party to lay 
the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission. Otherwise the factors of 
undue prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time 
remain for consideration under rule 403. 
3. Proof of Ownership, If Controverted 
For example, if a defendant denies owning the land where the plaintifT 
fell from a cliff~ evidence of the defendant's building a fence there will be 
admissible for the limited purpose of proving ownership. 
4. Proof of Control, If Controverted 
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For example, if a plaintiff has sued a store-owner for injuries resulting 
from a fall over a broken curb in front of the store at a mall, and the 
defendant has in its responsive pleading denied control of the curb (e.g., 
argues that the mall owners instead are responsible for the curb), then 
evidence that the store-owner has repaired the curb will be admissible for 
the limited purpose of proving the store-owner's control. If the store-
owner had admitted control, the evidence would have been inadmissible 
for the purpose. 
5. Proof of Feasibility of Precautionary Measures, If Feasibility Is 
Controverted 
The literal view of feasibility is whether something can be done. For 
example, if a plaintiff had fallen from a cliff on defendant's land, and the 
defendant contended, in its pleadings or evidence, that afence could not 
be built, the defendant would have controverted feasibility under the 
narrow view. But, when a subsequent remedial measure has been taken, it 
is highly unlikely that a defendant will assert that it could not be done. 
Another broader reading of feasibility incorporates concepts of utility 
and practicability. What, then, does it take to controvert feasibility? 
The majority rule requires that the defendant actively contest 
feasibility. E.g., Guilbeau v. W W Henry Co., 85 F.3d 1149, 1171 (5th 
Cir. 1996) ("Because [defendant] never claimed that it would not be 
feasible to make the adhesive without the solvents and sodium 
pentachlorophenate, its product labels used after the date of [plaintiff]'s 
alleged exposure were properly excluded from evidence as subsequent 
remedial measures."). See Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 638 (9th 
Cir.) ("In this case, AMF conceded that the safety devices were 
technologically and economically feasible but then argued that they 
concluded that the safety problem was not great enough to warrant the 
trade-off of consumer frustration, increased complexity of the product, and 
risk of consumer efforts to disconnect the safety device. "), opinion 
amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986). 
But not all authorities agree. See Meder v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 
(lOth Cir. 1984) (silence on the issue, or failure to stipulate sut1icient to 
"controvert" issue); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 
F.2d 883, 888-89 (5th Cir.) ("'The administration of Rule 407 could be 
greatly simplified if the appellate courts were to hold that in all of these 
[negligence and product liability] situations, feasibility of precautionary 
measures will be deemed "controverted" unless the defendant is prepared 
to make an unequivocal admission of feasibility. "') (quoting 23 C. Wright 
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1994). 
& K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5288, at 144 (1980»), 
rehearing denied, 699 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1983). 
The current state of affairs leads to tricky calls, as in Tuer v. 
McDonald, 347 Md. 507, 524-29, 701 A.2d 1101 (1997) (Wilner, 1.), 
affirming 112 Md. App. 121, 129-31,684 A.2d 478 (1996) (Fischer, 1.). 
The Court of Appeals held that a judgment call, in light of then-existing 
circumstances, that a particular action would have been "unsafe" (which 
judgment call was modified before trial) was not an assertion that the 
action was not feasible: "It was feasible but, in [defendant's] view, not 
advisable," at the time of the plaintiffs decedent's surgery. 
6. Impeachment 
a. Rule 5-407 Contemplates Impeachment by Contradiction 
Unlike Rules 5-408 and 5-411 that limit permissible impeachment to 
impeachment by bias or motive, Rule 5-407 refers to "impeachment" 
generally. Rule 5-407, therefore, contemplates impeachment by 
contradiction, at least in some circumstances. 
b. "Mere Contradiction" As to Having Followed Applicable 
Standard of Care Generally Held Improper 
Evidence merely tending to show that the defendant's actions at 
the time of the event (e.g., the plaintiffs fall) met the applicable 
standard of care cannot be impeached by evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures. To hold otherwise would be to allow the 
impeachment exception to swallow the rule,lo Harrison v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25 (l st Cir. 1992), just as Maryland's pre-
Rule (Wilson) "standard of care" exception had done. 
c. Impeachment by contradiction should be permitted only when 
the evidence has high probative value for that purpose, for 
example, if a witness testifies that the change was not made, that 
the condition was in the post-repair condition at the time of the 
accident, or when a witness has spoken in the superlative. For 
example, if the defendant's expert has testified that a curb height of 
three inches is lithe safest height" for a shopping mall sidewalk, the 
expert could be impeached by evidence that, after the plaintiffs fall, 
and at the expert's recommendation, the defendant raised its curbs to 
five inches. See, e.g., Wood v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 70 F.3d 
10 See Saltzburg, Martin, and Capra, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 487 (6th ed. 
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1201, 1208 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (designer of wood chipper "described the 
seventeen-inch chute as the 'safest length chute you could possible 
put on the machine'''; "Wood's counsel should have been allowed to 
ask why the supposedly safest design possible was modified after the 
accident involving Ginger Wood. But see Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2002) (2 to 1 decision) (affirming 
disallowance of impeachment by evidence of subsequent remedial 
measure, even when defense had contended that that measure "was 
not suited for the military environment"). 
Probative value also seems high if a defense witness has 
testified that a condition (the same one as that created by the 
subsequent remedial measure undertaken at the witness or the 
witness' employer's instance) is unsafe. For example, if a defense 
expert witness testified that a fence would be unsafe, evidence that the 
defendant had built a fence could be admissible for impeachment 
purposes, subject to Rule 5-403. See Dollar v. Long Mfg., Inc., 561 
F.2d 613,618 (5th Cir. 1977) (in wrongful death action arising from 
backhoe operator's having been crushed between control panel and 
safety cab, evidence of letter sent by manufacturer's design engineer 
to backhoe dealers warning of danger should have been admitted to 
impeach engineer, who testified that he believed backhoe was safe), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
But the plaintiff cannot back the defendant or its witnesses 
into a corner so as to elicit such a statement, in order to open the 
door to impeachment. See Tuer v. McDonald, 347 Md. at 530 n.l O. 
See also State v. Thurston, 1286 Md. App. 656, 668-70, 739 A.2d 940 
(1999). In Tuer, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant doctor's 
statement, elicited by plaintiff on direct of the doctor as an adverse 
witness, that restarting the anti-coagulant drug Heparin could have 
been unsafe, "must be read in context," as referring to the "judgment 
call based on his knowledge and collective experience at the time." 
347 Md. at 531-32. Therefore, impeachment was properly 
disallowed. 
If the defense introduces such testimony, the question for the 
trial court more likely boils down to whether the defense witness's 
testimony would leave an unfairly misleading impression on the jury, 
if impeachment is not permitted. 
F. Review Problem: Plaintiff v. Railroad in negligence for wrongful death of 
plaintiffs wife and child killed in collision with train at railroad crossing. 
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1. Plaintiff offers testimony of a witness that a week after the accident, the 
witness saw Railroad employees replace the wigwag signal with a flashing 
red light and wooden barrier. 
Admissible? 
2. Same testimony in 1., if Railroad alleged that the state highway commission, 
not the Railroad, was responsible for safety of crossings. 
Admissible? 
3. In 2., Defense counsel objects; Plaintiffs counsel says nothing; court sustains 
the objection. 
Error? 
4. Same testimony in 1., if Railroad's expert has testified that a wigwag signal is 
"the safest possible" way to mark a crossing. 
Your response to a 5-407 objection? 
5. Testimony of Railroad engineer that Railroad lowered speed limit from 90 to 
70 mph 2 months after the accident. 
Admissible? 
6. Testimony that Railroad fired conductor, after the accident, for having been 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. 
Admissible? 
7. Photograph of crossing taken two weeks after accident, when flashing red 
light and wooden barrier had been added by the Railroad. In response to 
defense counsel's objection, plaintiff offers photograph for permissible 
limited purpose, to show scene (pointing out this difference). 
Re5ponse by defense counsel? 
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Answers 
1. No. 
2. Yes, on issue of control. 
3. No. The ball is in proponent's court to offer the evidence for a permissible limited purpose. 
4. The proponent should offer the evidence for impeachment. 
5. No. 
6. No. 
7. Evidence should be excluded under Rule 5-403. See Daggett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 48 
Cal.2d 655,313 P.2d 557 (1957). But see Lebrecht v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 402 F.2d 585, 592 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (sufficient to have instructed jury to ignore the change, when court had admitted, to 
acquaint jury with the scene, photograph taken the day after an accident, even though it indicated that 
repairs were made). 
V. Hearsay Exception for Statements Made by Person Seeking Either Medical Treatment 
or Diagnosis in Contemplation of Treatment 
A. Rule 5-803(b)(4) 
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)( 4) provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: ... [(4) Statements for Purposes of 
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment] Statements made for purposes of medical 
treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in 
I · f II contemp atlOn 0 treatment. 
B. Hearsay Exception Does Not Apply When Possibility of Treatment is Not 
Contemplated by Declarant 
The circumstantial guarantee of sincerity is present only when the declarant 
seeks treatment, or diagnosis in order to determine whether treatment is necessary. 
The hearsay exception of 5-803(b)(4) is unavailable when the declarant consults a 
physician for other purposes, such as diagnosis (or evaluation) not intended to lead to 
possible treatment, which is the case when the declarant speaks with the physician 
solely to prepare the doctor to testifY as an expert witness. 
But -- perhaps because of distrusting the impartiality of the County doctors 
who examine children who are believed to have been possibly abused, the Court of 
Special Appeals, in a 2-to-l decision in Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 
67 (1998), misapplied the rule. 
The alleged victim in Low was a twelve-year-old girl. After a social worker's 
referral, she was examined by a physician who worked for the Montgomery County 
11 See generally vol. 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(4): I at 216-25. 
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Department of Health and Human Services. The doctor testified to her habit of 
generally explaining to children that they were there due to concern about their 
health, because of some unhappy experience that might have happened to them. 
(This testimony should have been held to be sufficient, pursuant to Md. Rule 5-406 
(habit or business routine), to show that the doctor had made such a statement to this 
child.) 
The doctor performed a thorough, head-to-toe physical examination, 
including eyes, ears, etc., and ordered laboratory tests; she ultimately concluded that 
no medical treatment was needed. She testified that, if she had found that treatment 
was necessary, she either would have provided it herself or referred the child to her 
own physician, if she had one. 
The trial judge credited the doctor's testimony and found the foundation laid 
for the 5-803(b)( 4) exception as to the girl's statements to the doctor, pertinent to 
treatment. He thus permitted the doctor to testify not only to her physical findings 
that the child's "vagina and anus both showed evidence of trauma and penetration by 
a foreign object," but also that the child had told the doctor that "she was hurt when 
'the perpetrator' put his penis in her vagina and in her 'butt' more than ten times." 
119 Md. App. at 416. The doctor testified that the child had not named "the 
perpetrator." Other evidence at trial identified the defendant. 
Judge Thieme, joined by Judge Byrnes, reversing the conviction, held that the 
child's statements to the doctor were not within Rule 5-803(b)( 4), because the doctor 
saw the child "for the sole purpose of examining and detecting child abuse," as "a 
part of the prosecution team." !d. at 415. The majority found insufficient evidence 
that the child-declarant knew that the purpose of the medical examination was 
treatment, if treatment were necessary. The majority indicated that it was "not 
entirely convinced by the record" that the physician "could have" treated the child. 
ld. at 423. On this point, it seems not to defer adequately to the trial judge's 
determination as to credibility. 
More importantly, the majority misread Rule 5-803(b)( 4), which does not 
require that treatment actually be provided. Judge Alpert properly dissented on this 
ground, because the child's statements "were, at the very least, 'made for purposes of 
... medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment,' which is covered by the Rule." 
ld. at 429 (Alpert, J. dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
The reason that the rule so provides is that "the guarantee of diagnosis and 
treatment," and whether "the medical purpose of the interview or the importance 
of truthful answers [with regard to obtaining the proper diagnosis and, if 
necessary, treatment]" was explained to the declarant. State v. Hinnant, 523 
S.E.2d 663, 669 (N.C. 2000). 
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In light of Low, it is critical that County doctors routinely explain those 
matters to their patients -- especially to children -- and it would be wise for the 
doctors to record their having given that explanation, and the child's response, in 
their notes. 
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